"The Burden of Proof: Fact-Checking and Credibility in Communication Networks"

Abstract

Can fact-checking improve communication in a network? I study a communication network where agents can publicly commit ex-ante to fact-check any message they send with a reliability of their choice. I show that truth-seeking agents use fact-checking as a device to verify information while biased agents—who want false opinions to spread—use fact-checking as a persuasion device to improve their credibility. I describe how a designer can implement full communication (all messages are trusted and transmitted) by choosing an appropriate cost for fact-checking commitment, to be paid by agents. Finally, I study who carries the "burden of proof"; that which agents bear the necessary fact-checking to ensure sufficient trust in the network. I show that when the cost of fact-checking is low, unbiased agents carry the "burden of proof." Conversely, when the cost is high, biased agents carry it.